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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is properly reposed in the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2, a Writ of Certiorari having been granted by
Order of the Court dated September 27, 2002.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statute as applied and interpreted in Utah decisional law is
determinative of the issue on appeal. The text of the statute is presented, in its
entirety, in the Addendum.
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
All references to numbered pages in the Trial Transcript (R. 141) hereafter
cited as uTrial Tr. "
1.

In May of 2000, Respondent, at the urging of his attorney,

approached several co-workers at Hill Air Force Base, and requested that they
write a statement on Respondent's behalf in conjunction with an ex-parte
protective order Respondent's estranged wife had filed. One such co-worker was
Airman Jason Lyon ("Lyon"). (Trial Tr. 99.)
2.

Respondent asked Lyon to include in his statement whether

Respondent had made threats against his estranged wife. (Trial Tr. 120-125.)
3.

Unbeknownst to Respondent, Lyon had, approximately one week

before, provided a written statement to the Office of Special Investigations
("OSI") of Hill Air Force Base wherein he stated, among other things, that he had

1

overheard Respondent make threats or speak threateningly against his estranged
wife. {Trial Tr. 25-29.)
4.

Lyon testified that at no time did Respondent make any verbal or

physical threats towards him nor did Respondent promise Lyon anything to induce
him to write the statement. {Trial Tr. 56.)
5.

Lyon agreed to write a statement on behalf of Respondent without

voicing any objection whatsoever. Subsequently, Lyon wrote a statement while he
was alone at his dormitory. He later gave the statement to Respondent. {Trial Tr.
33-34.)
6.

Lyon at no time told Respondent (1) about the OSI investigation; (2)

that Lyon had previously provided a written statement to OSI; (3) that the
statement which he had given to OSI was contrary to the statement he had given to
Respondent; or (4) that Lyon did not believe what he had written. {Trial Tr. 12325.)
7.

Lyon did not inform his superior officers or any member of OSI that

Respondent had asked for, and that he had provided him, a written statement.
{Trial Tr. 42-43, 46.)
8.

Respondent provided Lyon's written statement to his attorney Pete

Vlahos who subsequently submitted the same to the Second District Court in a
protective order hearing. {Trial Tr. 100.)
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9.

Lyon pleaded guilty to giving a false written statement, a Class B

Misdemeanor in exchange for his agreement to testify against Respondent. {Trial
Tr. 51-52.)
10.

Respondent's trial counsel Richard J. Culbertson passed, without

objection, the jury instructions which were ultimately given to the jury. {Trial Tr.
135-142.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Manifest injustice occurred when the trial court failed to instruct the jury
concerning the mental state or mens rea necessary to convict Respondent. On
appeal, Respondent has never charged that the trial court's "elements" instruction
(R-61) was erroneous. It tracks the language of the witness tampering statute as
did the elements instruction proposed by Respondent. The error lies in the trial
court's failure to give further instructions which set out the requisite mental state
necessary to convict Respondent. That omission1 was in no way induced, nor
invited by Respondent.
ARGUMENT
RESPONDENT DID NOT LEAD THE TRIAL COURT TO
COMMITT INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR. THEREFORE, THE
DOCTRINE OF "INVITED ERROR" IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS
CASE.
1

This Court's Order of September 27, 2002, granted certiorari on the issue of
whether "Defendant invited any instructional error where he proposed a jury
instruction containing the very language he attacked on appeal". Petitioner has
revised the issue, and rightly so, to address an omission rather than any erroneous
language contained in a jury instruction. Respondent has raised no such attack on
appeal.
3

The poml ol buMimim* loi ,in il\ sis oi (In issue picsriifal on appeal inn A
be the uncontested findings of the Court of Appeals: (1) The Utah witness
tampering statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508, does not specify a mens rea for the
"attempt to indiiu' Humnl

\hih \ deukgeuzian

M P M1 MO <i M (I Hah

2002); (2) Whereas the statutory iteration of the offense does not specify a
culpable mental state, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 provides that u[I]ntent,
knowledge, <u recklessness" shall s.ilish (he ///< US n a i ixji 11 renu^iil Id Mi 1 he
trial court's instructions entirely omitted the required mental state. Id.; (4) I he
failure to instruct on requisite mental state constitutes reversible error as a matter
of law. Id., citing State vs. Chaney, 98l) F M 11 Ijy, Sec also Stale i s.
Stringham, 957 F.2d 602 (Utah Ct. \pp 1998) and American Fork vs. Carr} 970
P.2d 717, (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
A. Invited Error Must be Based on Some Affirmative \i I of a
Defendant
Absent a finding that Respondent invited the trial court's error, his
conviction for witness tampering must be overturned to avoid manifest injustice,
despite Respondent's failure to object to written in Inn In n> il In il I Hah 11.
Crim. P., 19(e). Petitioner asserts that Respondent may not take advantage of the
manifest injustice exception because he invited error. Petitioner's assertion of
invited iiiui hinges sulciv on (In l,u 1 lli.il bh spomU n( ptupo »t (I <m i lements
instruction at trial which accurately tracked the statutory elements, but did not
address the mental state required for witness tampering. While true, that action
4

did not constitute an invitation to error under the doctrine developed b\ 11 Kill
courl. Respondent's Inms^ression .tl worst, was one ol unwitting omission;
Invited error is, by definition, a sin of commission.
In one the earliest references to the interplay between invited error and
Utah 1/ (MIII V l*)(ellhM ouil mSfaie v\ Medina M8 l> M III M, 1023 (Utah
1987) noted that invited error occurred when Defendant's counsel "consciously
chose not to assert any objection that might have been raised and affirmatively led
the trial i out! lo believe lhal Iheir w is imllnn^ wiotip w illi Ihe mstiuetion"
(emphasis added). Id., at 1023. In State vs. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1009 (Utah
1996), this Court further explained that a Defendant "[CJannot lead the Court into
error by failing to object ami Ihen lalei, when lie is di ^pleased w ilh Ihe ^ etdiet,
profit by his actions," (citations omitted.) Id., at 1009. Finally, in State of Utah
vs. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the Utah Court of
Appeals refused to reverse a conviction statini" 11ial Ihe | impose ol Ihe imitul eimi
doctrine is "[To] avoid permitting defendant to invite error and then implant it in
the record as a form of appellate insurance against an adverse sentence." Id., at
129.! W ithout question, invited error requires some conscious, affirmative ai(ion
of the Defendant which leads the trial court to commit instructional error. In the
present case, Respondent took no such action.
The concept that invited error must be based on some alfiniialhe ac lion of
tin* i )efendant nil her than an omission is borne out in Utah case law. The
following is a survey of actions undertaken by defendants which have been held to
5

constitute invited error* In State vs. Medina, snpui ami auam in Siu »< i s
Anderson, 929 V <i 1107 (Utah 1996) invited error was found when defense
counsel at trial affirmatively represented to the trial court that a specific erroneous
instruction was appropriate and unobjectionable Both t asi * distinguished (In
coiidiiil IIOIII flinch irmaining silent. hiState vs. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991), a Defendant challenged two jury instructions on appeal which
were proposed by the Defendant and given by the trial court In State vs Kmluk,
957 1" M Id h( Haii t ( \pp. 1999), a Defendant raised an objection at trial, but
failed to propose a curative instruction when specifically invited to do so by the
trial court. In State vs Chaney, 989 P 2d 1091 (Utah Ct App 19W), a Detendant
objected to an elements instil u lion }\\m li i mil inn <1 i \ mn t t mens iea
requirement and then challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on that
element. Invited error was invoked in each of the cited cases, only on a showing
thai tin D e l i miaul i l f m i u d w l\ d i d MHIH linn*' lli il n i h i l at I I h< It i il < o m t mil

occasioned the instructional error.
The only Utah case which arguably addresses an omission in an instruction
proposed h\ 1 k k itdanl is State vs. Stevenson, supra In 111 it t a\e lln Itiil unit's
jury instruction in a rape case omitted the then statutory element that the victim
and accused not be married. The Court rejected a challenge to the instruction
because ttit utiiilkd i lunnil \\a an \ it tt issue in the case Ra an t all t \ fdaiee
admitted at trial was that the parties were never married, the court found the
omission to be harmless error. In dicta, the court indicated that the defendants'
6

proposed mens rea instruction, which likewise omitted the non mat i ntge eh incut,
would also |it i<
' ludi .M hallenge on the basis of invited error. In addition to the
Stevenson case not being decided primarily on invited error, factual disparities
distinguish it from the present case. While non-marriage was not at issue in llu
Stevenson cusi. Iht menial state of Respondent was the lynch pin of the present
case. Respondent's request for a written statement from Airman Lyon without any
threat or inducement, on its face, did not constitute witness tampering. In order to
convict Respondent Ihefim kid to k peisuaded Hi il Rrsj ondi itl lequested a
statement which he knew Airman Lyons would believe to be false. Accordingly,
Respondent's mental state was pivotal in the present case.
Factually, oilier dtstitu lions i \ist bthuvti Stevenson \m\ ih« present case.
In Stevenson, the instruction proposed by the defendant omitted one of the
statutory elements of rape. By contrast, the statutory elements instruction
proposed h\ Respondent in litis case, accm alek And i oinpletely set forth (lie
statutory elements of witness tampering. In Stevenson, the omission of the nonmarriage element was apparently a conscious decision based on it not being an
issue. In the present ease llu huhiu to instrui I on (In appiopiiate mental l tate,
which is not included in the statute, appears to have been an oversight by
prosecutor, defense counsel and trial court alike.

/

!;

Respondent did not Lead lllln Trinl < 'omi ( I/'jr " hv ri oposiii^ mi
Elements Instruction.

Respondent proposed a witness tampering elements instruction at trial
which did nothing more than track the statutory elements found in fc /6-K-50X | K24). I ikew ise, Petitioner proposed a sin lilai elei nei its ii istr i iction w 1 licl 1 also
tracked the statutory language of the witness tampering statute. (R-32). The trial
court eventually adopted Instruction No. 29 which sets forth the pertinent statutory
elen iei its in the context of the facts of the case. (R -61) Eacl I of tl le three \ ersions
accurately describes the statutory elements of witness tampering. None of them
include the requisite mental state for committing the crime which does not appear
on the face of the stati ite. As far as they go, the insti i ictions are acci irate ai id not
erroneous. Simply providing an accurate recitation of statutory elements of a
crime cannot be an invitation to err.
It" the Utah Rules of Criminal 1'ioeuliirc required (lul "the elements
instruction" contain all of the statutory elements as well as the requisite mental
state in a single integrated instruction, then Respondent's proposed jury instruction
might be viewed as misleading the Irnil * omit 1 lowever., tl lere is no i equiremei it ii I
Utah Law that the required mental state be coupled with the statutory elements in a
single instruction. In practice, that likely happens when the requisite mental state
is spelled out in the language of the stati ite W 1 iei I tl le elei i lent of Ii itent is i lot set
forth in the statute, a separate instruction delineating intent is not uncommon. In
State v. Larsen, 876 P2d 391, the Utah Court of Appeals acknowledges the
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legitimacy of giving separate element instructions ami menial state instruelinm,
even when the prerequisite mental state was included within the statutory
elements:
We believe that jury instructions No. 23 adequately instructed the
jury on the elements of the theft.... Instruction No. 23 mirrored the
language of the theft statute.... further, the other jury instructions
adequately instructed the jury on the issue of intent... .Instruction
No. 15 states the necessity of and defines "intent" as the mental state
with which a person acts.
Id, at 396.
Given that Respoi ident was i lot required to include a mental state element
together with the statutory element of witness tampering, than failure to do so is
simply an omission to instruct on one of the essential facets of the case. That
omission was i lot ai I affii i i lath • e act of the R espondei it. ' I 'he trial court did not
invite Respondent to propose a mental state instruction as in Kiriluk, supra. The
trial court did not query Respondent as to whether he objected to the failure to
instri ict the ji ir> on niei ital state, nor did R espondent object to an insti i iction
containing the proper mental state as in Chaney, supra. A comprehensive review
of the record reveals simply that mental state was inadvertently overlooked and
omitted from the it isti i lctioi i b> ti ial coi n t, prosecutoi , and defense coi insel

I lie

risk of the omission occurring emanated from the absence of the requisite mental
state in the statute, not from any action of the Respondent.
If a defendant w 1 10 fails to discover and repoi t ai i oi t lissioi i. ii I the jury
instructions commits invited error, then the manifest injustice exception under
Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ceases to exist. The position

taken by Petitioner in this appeal would effectively transfer the burden of correctly
instructing the jury from the trial court to the defendant. Simply remaining silent
on an instruction, as did the defendant in State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 159 (Utah 1991),
would constitute invited error and would preclude the defendant from thereafter
appealing an erroneous instruction. If taking some affirmative action which
misleads the court is excised from the doctrine of invited error, then a defendant
would bear a higher burden than a prosecutor who's duty it is to prove each and
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501,
and a higher burden than the trial court which bears the ultimate responsibility to
instruct the jury correctly. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981).
Utah courts have consistently held that failure to instruct a jury on the
culpable mental state required to commit a crime, by definition, is manifest
injustice. State v. Chaney, supra; State v. Stringham, supra; and American Fork
v. Carr, supra. That was never truer than in the present case where the facts
elevate Respondent's mental state to the determinative issue before the jury.
Where Respondent did nothing more than offer an element instruction which
mirrored the statutory elements of witness tampering, it would be grossly unjust to
deprive him of the opportunity for a fair trial before an adequately instructed jury.
C.

Petitioner Misreads the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner incorrectly interprets the decision of the Court of Appeals to
mean that instructional error cannot be invited unless the Defendant also objected
to a correct instruction (Pet'r.s Br. at 6). The actual rationale utilized by the Court
10

of Appeals to determine that Respondent did not invite error was that
Respondent's conduct, did not affirmatively lead the trial court to commit error.
"Here, the State has not shown that Defendant's (Geukgeuzian's) conduct actually
led the trial court into its erroneous action. Thus, the invited error doctrine does
not apply in this case." Geukgeuzian at 643.
The Court of Appeals drew distinctions between the facts of the present
case and the facts of Chaney, supra, because Petitioner was relying on Chaney as a
case "on all fours" to establish invited error against Respondent. The Court of
Appeals simply indicated that reliance to be unfounded because in that case the
defendant successfully opposed a correct instruction which was ultimately not
given by the court. In that case, the defendant's actions obviously affirmatively
mislead the trial court.
This Court may not reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the
Defendant's conviction as requested in the Petitioner's Brief, without remanding
the case to the Court of Appeals. (Pet'r.'s Br. at 12.) Based on its finding of
manifest injustice, the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel on the charge of witness tampering. State vs. Geukgeuzian,
(footnote 3). The issue of ineffective assistance had been fully briefed before the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner now asks this Court to reject Respondent's
ineffective assistance claims, without the benefit any briefing, exclusively on the
strength of a footnote included in the Brief of Petitioner. (Pet'r.'s Br. at fn. 3).
Under the circumstances, if this Court reverses the Court of Appeals' finding of
11

manifest injustice, the case must be remanded for a decision on the issue of
ineffective assistance, which the Court of Appeals did not reach below.
CONCLUSION
This Court should uphold the Court of Appeals' reversal of Respondents
conviction for tampering with a witness. If this Court elects to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the case should be remanded for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 2% day of February, 2003.
PETERSON REED & WARLAUMONT L.L.C.

Kendall S. Peterson
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this #ff- day of February, 2003,1 caused two
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be sent by U.S. mail,
postage prepaid to the following:

J. Frederick Voros, Jr.
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Utah Attorney General
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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ADDENDUM

14

Rule 19(e).

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are
given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall
provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless
a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction
may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In statig (sic)
the objection the party shall identify the matter to whcih (sic) the objection is
made and the ground of the objection matter to which he objects and the ground of
his objection.

15

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you can convict the defendant of TAMPERING WITH
A WITNESS as charged in the Information, you must find from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements
of the crime:
1.

That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County,

State of Utah;
2.

The defendant, Stephen L. Geukgeuzian, believing

that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about
to be instituted;
3.

Attempted to induce or other cause a person to:

a.

Testify or inform falsely; or

b.

Withhold any testimony, information, document, or

item.

If you find both of the above elements proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty;
however, if the State has failed to prove any of the above
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the
defendant not guilty.

nnn24

INSTRUCTION NO.
In any criminal case, to establish the commission of any crime charged, the State must
prove certain essential facts which the statutes of this State define as being the necessary
elements constituting the crime charged. In the case before the court, proof of the commission
of the crime of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in the
Information requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following essential facts:
1. If believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, the defendant attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to:
a. Testify or inform falsely;
b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item;
c. Elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence, or
d. Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been
summoned.
2. If the defendant:
a. Commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another as a
witness or informant;
b. Solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing
any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or
c. Communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to
be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed or to be performed by
the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation.

If you find the evidence has failed to prove any one or more of these essential elements
to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, then it would be your duty to find the defendant
not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in the
Information. On the other hand, if you find from the evidence received during the trial that the
State has proven each and every one of those essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it
would be your duty to find the defendant guilty of the offense of TAMPERING WITH A
WITNESS, a Third Degree Felony.

INSTRUCTION NO

Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of TAMPERING WITH
A WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah:

2.

The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, believing that an official proceeding
or investigation is pending or about to be instituted;

3.

Attempted to induce or other cause a person to:
a.

Testify or inform falsely; or

b.

Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as
charged in Count 1 of the Information.
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A
WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information.
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